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Abstract 
 
Good boardroom decision-making can be facilitated by appropriate policies 
and processes. However, even when combined with well-intentioned and 
competent directors, such policies and processes may not be sufficient to 
ensure that good decisions are being made.  The paper argues that board 
decision-making is negatively affected by behavioural factors including 
conflicts of interest, emotional attachments, dominant personalities, anchored 
attitudes, a reluctance to meaningfully involve independent directors, implicit 
‗no-go‘ areas, and unwarranted reliance on prior experience and decisions.  
This study calls attention to the impact of bias on boardroom decision-making 
and argues that social-psychological factors undermine corporate governance 
mechanisms designed to monitor and control CEO behaviour.  Bias in the 
boardroom particularly weakens the contribution to corporate governance of 
the independent director.  Mechanisms and processes to mitigate the impact 
of bias in the boardroom are suggested. 
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Key issues 
 
In view of widespread perceptions that current governance principles all too 
frequently fail to prevent significant destruction of shareholder value, the 
central focus of this contribution relates to making boards, as a key element of 
governance, more effective.   Hence, the discussion centres on issues relating 
to: 
 
 The quality of board decision-making; 
 The impact of dominant senior managers; 
 Poor board leadership and lack of independent voice; 
 The role of the Chair and the Senior Independent Director; 
 Behavioural impacts on board decision-making. 
 
Key questions to be discussed include: 
 
 What is the correct boardroom behaviour and board culture? 
 How can we enhance the quality of board decision-making? 
 How do we ensure that boards are and remain accountable and in 
control of the organization? 
 
Main arguments 
 
i. Bias in the boardroom is inevitable and frequently underestimated. 
 
ii. Bias plays a significant role in poor board decision-making. 
 
iii. Bias particularly undermines the perceived benefits of independent 
directors. 
 
iv. Governance regulation needs to emphasize the effects of bias on 
decision-making and mandate the use of de-biasing procedures. 
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Introduction 
 
The paradigmatic approach to ‗good‘ corporate governance for companies in 
terms of an overall focus on appropriate internal control and risk management 
procedures, places the responsibilities for such procedures firmly with the 
board, supported by a formal structure of board committees (Cadbury, 1992; 
Gwilliam and Marnet, 2010).  Reflecting on the board‘s responsibilities, the 
Companies Act 2006 (UK, 2006), for example, refers to the duty of directors to 
exercise independent judgment (Companies Act 2006 SS.173), while the 
ICSA Review (ICSA, 2010) of the Higgs Guidance on the Role and 
Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (Higgs, 2003) notes the importance 
of the quality of board decision-making and the particular weight given in 
governance to independent judgement.  The contribution of the independent 
director to the quality of board decision-making is of critical importance given 
the large proportion of independent directors on the board and board 
committees in reaction to high-profile corporate scandals earlier this decade. 
 
Calls for more diligent stewardship of the corporation, in part a reaction to 
recent high-profile corporate scandals, but also arising from a long-standing 
dissatisfaction with conventional responses to destructive leadership (Clarke 
et al., 2003; Marnet, 2008; Forbes and Watson, 2010), would appear to 
increasingly require a radical rethink of corporate governance principles and 
philosophy.  While existing corporate governance mechanisms and the 
market for corporate control eventually act to shield the majority of firms from 
the worst consequences of poor executive decisions and failed monitoring by 
the board, this frequently occurs only after the destruction of significant 
corporate value (Forbes and Watson, 2010).  Research into the causes of 
high-profile corporate scandals and details emerging on the global financial 
crisis would seem to reinforce the impression that independent judgement, 
constructive debate and challenge in the boardroom remain the exception 
(Gwilliam and Marnet, 2010).   
 
Serving on a board inherently creates the risk of a biased decision-maker, and 
extant research suggests that bias in perception and judgement is an 
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inescapable factor of human choice-behaviour (Bazerman and Malhotra, 
2006).  Flawed decisions can be made with the best of intentions, and 
competent individuals can believe passionately that they are making a sound 
judgment when they are not.  Factors known to distort judgment include 
conflicts of interest, deference to authority, peer pressure, emotional 
attachments, and inappropriate reliance on previous experience and previous 
decisions (ICSA, 2010).   
 
The remainder of the paper discusses the impact of bias on the quality of 
board decision-making and argues that common social-psychological factors 
undermine the monitoring function of boards, with a particularly negative 
impact on the functional independence of non-executive directors.   The 
article is informed by participant-observer research on the governance failures 
of an organization that suffered significant adverse performance resulting in 
its near collapse (Marnet, 2010a,b), which mirror insights by Forbes and 
Watson (2010), who note that organizations characterised by ―strong 
managers and weak owners‖ (Roe, 1994) expose themselves to ―destructive 
leadership‖ risks (Padilla, et al., 2007) due to board loyalty biases, little 
mitigated by current corporate governance codes.  
 
Bias in the boardroom 
 
In deriving a theory of governance based on incentives, disclosure and 
monitoring, a typical normative assumption in corporate governance is that of 
the self-interest of agents to guide their actions, protect shareholder‘s equity 
and act in their own best long-term interest. This approach has the flaw of 
being based on a poor model of human choice behaviour, a model which can 
be extended to provide for better descriptions of actual agent behaviour 
(Marnet, 2008). The shortcomings of the rational actor model as a basis for 
the description of human choice behaviour are, however, increasingly 
recognized by regulators and those tasked to improve on existing guidelines. 
The ICSA Review of the Higgs guidance (2003) suggests that appropriate 
policies and processes facilitate good decision-making, but are likely to be 
insufficient in the presence of behavioural factors that can lead to flawed 
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decisions (ICSA, 2010). The ICSA Review calls particular attention to the 
detrimental impact of social and psychological factors on the quality of 
boardroom decision-making and the effect of bias on the contribution of the 
independent director. 
 
Central to the scores of corporate disasters in recent years has been the 
failure of the monitoring function of boards, the entity that holds management 
accountable (Collier, 2005). These scandals are typically seen as a problem 
of corruption and/or incompetence.  No doubt, this is part of the story, but the 
bigger story is likely one of bias of key governance agents (Bazerman and 
Watkins, 2004; Coffee, 2001, 2003b, Prentice, 2000, 2003).  Biased decisions 
in the boardroom are suggested to be a major contributing factor to what 
ultimately is seen as fraudulent, imprudent and/or destructive behaviour of 
executive management and the acquiescence to such activities by the board 
(and other gatekeepers).  It will come as no surprise that people are affected 
by group loyalties, friendship, and non-pecuniary self-interest.  Nevertheless, 
these potential sources of bias are typically ignored or deemed to be of only 
minor importance by courts and standard setters who seem to share a 
widespread presumption that independent directors can make decisions 
without being affected by their own preferences, motivations, social ties, and 
peer pressure, or that directors acting in good faith are capable of overcoming 
their biases (Marnet, 2008).1  Such interpretations rely on the assumption that 
rational and competent individuals will make objective analyses and utilize all 
available information to ensure the best outcome for the firm.   
 
In contrast, behavioural research on decision-making shows that bias can 
significantly affect the judgement of agents in governance and the quality of 
decisions made at board level (Prentice, 2003; Marnet, 2010a,b).  Social-
psychological factors may significantly undermine the work of the board as a 
mechanism ostensibly designed to monitor, guide and control CEO behaviour.  
                                                          
1
 For example, the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that ―most‖ friendships were not of a 
sufficiently ―bias-producing nature‖ to negate a director‘s independence (Beam ex rel. Martha 
Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004). If the courts do 
recognize these biases, they typically assume that a director‘s good faith efforts or competing 
interests, such as a director‘s reputational interest, will prevent biased decision making. 
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The impact of bias on decision-making particularly questions the contribution 
of the independent director, who is given key importance in the mitigation of 
agency problems by the current governance paradigm (Higgs, 2003; Gwilliam 
and Marnet, 2010). Widespread board acquiescence to what subsequently is 
revealed as poor corporate decision-making or fraud would indicate a need to 
explore key behavioural effects on the quality of decision-making in the 
boardroom (Gwilliam, 2009).  The more obvious and highly publicised cases 
of destructive (and fraudulent) leadership such as Enron and WorldCom are, 
thankfully, quite rare, although bias undoubtedly played a role in the (poor) 
decisions of the respective boards.  A more insidious and widespread problem 
is the potential for massive destruction of shareholder value stemming from 
common behaviour patterns of corporate elites and board members where 
fraud do not play a major role (or indeed none at all), but changes in 
leadership do not take place before significant damage has occurred (Marnet, 
2008; Gwilliam and Marnet, 2010; Forbes and Watson, 2008).2   
 
Challenges to the dominant governance paradigm have come from those who 
question the ability of independent directors to satisfactorily perform the 
variety of roles expected from them3, and from those who argue that the 
‗approved‘ governance mechanisms put in place have been demonstrably 
ineffective in checking corporate irregularity to date and are unlikely to be any 
more effective in the future (Clarke et al, 2003; Gwilliam and Marnet, 2010).  
An example of related research is given in Marnet (2007, 2008) who cautions 
against the exclusive use of the rational choice model of decision-making in 
explaining agent behaviour in corporate governance and proposes the use of 
psychologically more realistic assumptions.  Prentice (2003) examined 
Enron‘s collapse using a behavioural perspective, to arrive at more realistic 
policy prescriptions than those that can be derived from a strict reliance on the 
                                                          
2
 Examples of non-rational (in the economists‘ interpretation) behaviour include commitment 
to lost causes, belief perseverance, and the underestimation of risk. Cognitive dissonance 
(the clash between conduct and principles), frequently leads to beliefs being adapted to 
conform with own conduct, which further distorts perception and judgment. A further 
complication is that preferences and beliefs may not be formed prior to observations of own 
behaviour.  Hence the causation may, at times, run from behaviour to beliefs (see Bazerman 
and Malhotra, 2006).   
3
 See for example Ezzamel and Watson (1997), see also Spira (2003) and Spira and Bender 
(2004) for further discussion of this issue. 
7 
 
rational actor model. These authors argue that conventional law and 
economics theory still largely ignores behavioural insights which forceful 
demonstrate how law and economics (and much extant governance 
regulation) is built on a raft of inaccurate assumptions on human judgement 
and decision-making behaviour, leading to ineffective and potentially 
counterproductive policy prescriptions.4  Such insights have profound 
implications on the definition of director independence. In definitions of 
director independence, the standard governance paradigm focuses on issues 
related to business and family relationships, and is essentially based on 
financial incentives. The inconclusive relationship found in research between 
corporate performance and the proportion of independent directors on the 
board or the various committees supports the argument that the benefits of 
independent directors, as traditionally defined, are limited (Mehran, 1995; 
Klein, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 1999, 2002; Larcker et al. 2007). 
 
Based on a synthesis of more than four decades of social psychology 
research (see, inter alia, Jolls et al., 1998; Thaler, 2000; Rabin, 2002), the 
presumption of independence based on simple metrics focusing on the 
absence of financial and family ties would appear to be inadequate. 
Regardless of a director‘s good faith, subconscious and, to a significant 
extent, uncontrollable cognitive processes prevent a director‘s decisions from 
being unaffected by their preferences and board loyalties.  Biased decision-
making can thus occur in the absence of direct or indirect monetary incentive 
and it can be shown that individuals can often neither identify nor control their 
own biases. Gatekeepers may unknowingly favour themselves, friends and in-
groups, to the detriment of the firm and its various stakeholders. The broad 
argument is that parties with an interest in viewing facts in a certain light are 
not capable of independent and objective judgment (Moore and Lowenstein, 
2004; Moore et al., 2003). 
 
                                                          
4
 See Prentice (2000) for a detailed application of behavioural insights to auditing and 
accounting.  Also, Coffee (2003a,b) who investigates behavioural and regulatory causes of 
the failures of gatekeepers in corporate governance. 
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Functional independence, in the sense of directors being professional 
referees (Fama, 1980), board monitors (Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b) and 
gatekeepers (Coffee, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 2003b), remains an elusive goal 
(Clarke et al., 2003). Indeed, some scholars would argue that initiatives such 
as increasing the proportion of independent directors on a board and board 
subcommittees are manifestations of the agency problem rather than a 
solution to it (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003).  While controlling for managerial 
conflicts of interest is one of the essential monitoring functions of the board 
(Langevoort, 2001a) a board operates within a framework of dependence, 
social ties, loyalties, and behavioural norms which forms an environment 
where critical assessment of managerial actions may be neglected.  Jensen 
(1993, p. 863) reflects on board culture as an important component of failure 
of board function when he describes an atmosphere of: ―… courtesy, 
politeness and deference at the expense of truth and frankness during board 
meetings, reflecting a general reluctance of confronting a CEO regarding 
management decisions, which is seen as both a symptom and cause of failure 
in the control system.” (Jensen, 1993, p. 863).  Such a culture may be 
perpetuated by the typical selection for membership on boards of directors 
based on compatibility, fit, consensus, and cooperation (Langevoort, 2001b).   
 
An overly strong emphasis on teamwork, conflict-avoidance, and consensus 
opinion may be a contributing factor to board capture by the CEO, providing 
executive management with significant powers to engage in activities to the 
detriment of stakeholders (Bebchuk et al., 2002). Such an interpretation of 
managerial power would seriously undermine the arm‘s length model of 
boards and their crucial gatekeeper function, and is in stark contrast to the 
optimal-contracting view where directors take an adversarial position against 
management  (Bebchuk et al., 2002).  Board capture is not the only, nor a 
necessary, influence bearing against independence.  Groups such as boards 
of directors, are highly subject to groupthink (Janis, 1972; 1989) and 
polarization (McHoskey, 1995), with potentially negative effects on the quality 
of decisions.  While an ideal board would act to counter the groupthink 
tendencies of an in-group, group social effects are a potent influence against 
critical opinion.  The social dynamics that exist in any group motivate 
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members to arrive at a consensus, which may negate the potential for group 
decision making to moderate extreme views, and can instead lead to 
increased polarization (Janis, 1972; Myers, 1982; McHoskey, 1995). Board 
deliberations may increase biased pre-decision processing, the biased 
processing before committing a consequential decision (Brownstein, 2003).5 
 
Poor board decision-making may be less of a question about integrity, but 
more a case of the ‗objective‘, ‗rational‘, ‗competent‘, and ‗honest‘, director 
falling prey to the powerful effects of psychological bias.  If bias can result not 
only from corruption or intentional malfeasance, but rather from unintentional 
(and often subconscious) motivational and cognitive processes, unbiased 
decision making may be beyond the best of directors‘ abilities.  Subtle 
conflicts of interest, like those involving directors‘ indirect personal and social 
benefits, may not be obvious to directors who interpret their situations 
differently from impartial observers. To compound the problem, even where 
people allow for the possibility of their judgement and decisions being biased, 
they typically underestimate the effect, and insufficiently adjust for this.  If lack 
of conscious awareness of the impact of bias is a major problem, and this 
paper suggests it is, this has the further implication that the solution cannot be 
based on conscious cost-benefit analysis.  This would greatly diminish the 
impact of sanctions as a guide to behaviour.6  The explicit view, based on 
people knowing their preferences, yields the traditional, but arguably 
ineffective, regulatory and legal response to corporate scandals such as the 
imposition of sanctions on violations of professional standards, more rules, 
disclosure of conflicts of interest, and other interventions aimed at changing 
the cost/benefit calculation of the decision maker towards compliance with 
rules.  If most of the problem is implicit, with people largely unaware of what 
guides their judgement and behaviour, these explicit barriers to corruption will 
have limited impact.  It is particularly difficult to maintain a duty of 
                                                          
5
 Human inference is subject to a set of cognitive and motivational filters which persistently 
interfere with an objective interpretation of information, including over-optimism; escalation of 
commitment; prior views, decisions and experience; emotional attachment; confirmation bias; 
a preference for the status quo; obedience to authority. 
6
 Bazerman and Watkins (2004). Predictable surprises:  The disaster you should have seen 
coming and how to prevent them (arguing that recent financial scandals were caused in 
significant part by auditors‘ lack of independence). 
 
10 
 
independence and objectivity where unanimity in boardroom decision-making 
is emphasized.  The expression of independent judgement is actively inhibited 
where this openly conflicts with the views of executive management and the 
Chair. Accountability under such pressures is then severely undermined, 
which will directly impact on a board‘s judgement of the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of the organization‘s risk management and internal control 
systems. 
 
Biased judgement contributes to the phenomenon of destructive leaders 
(Forbes and Watson, 2010).  Padilla et al. (2007) argue that for destructive 
leadership to take hold and to generate extreme negative outcomes there 
typically needs to be a ‗toxic triangle‘ consisting of ‗destructive leaders, 
susceptible followers and conducive environments‘.  All three of these 
elements are present in the widely-held corporation. Executive leaders 
frequently cultivate susceptible followers and create the necessary conducive 
environment through their exploitation of a pronounced loyalty bias (Forbes 
and Watson, 2010).  This may lead in even formally ‗independent‘ boards of 
directors displaying excessive loyalty towards their CEO‘s long after it has 
become apparent to outsiders that the incumbent CEO is destroying corporate 
value and ought to be replaced. 
 
Finally, induction sessions, and recommendations to regularly update and 
refresh skills and knowledge, as suggested in the Higgs Guidance (Higgs, 
2003) and discussed in the current ICSA Review (ICSA, 2010) of the latter are 
necessary ingredients to promoting board effectiveness.  Nevertheless, formal 
training in important areas where a minimum amount of expertise is deemed 
instrumental to support governance by directors, will not inevitably lead to 
better decision-making if the effects of bias are ignored or acknowledged in 
passing only.  Appeals to ‗objective‘, ‗rational‘, ‗independent‘, and ‗informed‘ 
decisions will largely fail to have the desired effect where board processes 
and procedures are actively aimed at minimizing the impact of bias on 
individual and group judgement. 
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Conclusion 
 
This paper suggests that critical assessment of, and dissent to, poor decisions 
by executive management is typically undermined by common social and 
psychological factors present in the boardroom.  Despite best intentions, bias 
in the boardroom is inevitable, board dominance by executive managers 
remains wide-spread, and independent judgment by non-executive directors 
more evident in its absence.  Constructive debate and challenge remain 
elusive in boardroom deliberations, with detrimental effects on the quality of 
decision-making.  The perceived benefit of independent directors—unbiased 
judgment – may be achievable in the exception only, which makes the 
independent director, in its present form, a weaker component of good 
governance than commonly assumed. This highlights the need to implement 
guidelines for board procedures which aim to de-bias decision-making.  
 
One recommendation is to frequently change the decision maker to minimize 
the bias introduced by being responsible for a prior decision and to allow for 
the emergence of a different perspective.  This has implications for the rules 
and guidelines on board membership, the rotation of board members, stricter 
rules on tenure and the re-election, the need for outsiders to come on a 
board, and cross-membership.  It is imperative to separate the decision-maker 
from the performance monitor. The same board (or board 
members/committees) cannot reliably form judgement over the performance 
of a project or decision for which it was originally responsible. 
 
The election of strictly time-limited directors, without possibility for renewal or 
subsequent re-election, with the explicit task to identify weaknesses in the 
governance of the firm, would further support the emergence of an 
independent view on the board.  True outsiders can act as a potent guard 
against the inevitable in-group tendencies which diminish the benefits of non-
executive directors.  Since a single dissenting individual may find it difficult to 
be heard, and may be particularly reluctant to voice concerns when the board 
seems to display unanimous consent to a particular proposal,   especially 
where a dominant CEO appears to be supported by a respected Chair, it is 
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suggested to elect two or three such outsider directors at a time, to allow the 
creation of a critical mass as a counterweight to established views on the 
board.  
 
It is here where the senior independent director can have a significantly 
positive impact on the quality of board decision-making, in normal times, but 
particularly also when the board is undergoing a period of stress.  To 
encourage independent thinking, a senior independent director should be 
cautious of bias in the decision-making process, promote the diversity of 
views, and employ means to institutionalize (legitimate) dissent.  It would be 
of immense additional benefit for a board to have a number of meetings 
without executive management present, and for meetings between the board 
and the external auditor, again without the presence of executive 
management.  The senior independent director may wish to hold regular 
meetings with other independent directors to discuss important decisions and 
proposals.  The senior independent director might also be called upon to act 
as co-Chair in setting agendas and in the guidance of the general tone on 
boardroom deliberations to ensure that dissenting voices are heard. 
 
Boards may wish to consider a number of decision-making strategies that can 
reduce the impact of unconscious bias. Such approaches include dividing the 
task into an information search, a general discussion and then a decision by 
different group members or separate committees (the ICSA Review notes: 
―Some chairs favour, for example, three separate discussions for important 
decisions – concept; proposal for discussion, proposal for decision‖); seeking 
the advice of non-traditional outsiders; requiring decision makers to justify 
their information choices; appointing a ‗devil‘s advocate‘, thereby ensuring 
opposing arguments are given more consideration; deliberately framing a 
decision problem in multiple ways; seeking dis-confirmatory information (i.e. to 
look for information and arguments which do not support a proposal); 
documenting the process that was used to arrive at and challenge a proposal 
prior to and during board deliberations; and establishing a sub-committee to 
assess the appropriateness of the decision process, in addition to assessing 
the merits of the proposal itself. 
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